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Abstract: This paper explores how human rights activism has led to the formal
institutionalization of new accountability standards including formal guidelines on prosecutions
and amnesties at the United Nations. The paper also explores how norm entrepreneurs inside
and outside the UN Security Council have shaped Security Council practice such that it is now
contributing to the protection of human rights through selective humanitarian intervention and
referrals to the International Criminal Court; as well as the further development of the justice
norm through its initiative on the rule of law and the endorsement of UN standards for
transitional states. The paper examines how the advocacy practices of the human rights
movement have contributed to these developments. It also asks the question whether or not
particular Security Council practices should be understood as a new form of human rights
advocacy and what the implications of increased Security Council involvement in the regulation
of domestic human rights practices of states might be.
Key words: United Nations, Security Council, human rights, rule of law, individual criminal
accountability, humanitarian intervention, responsibility to prosecute
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Introduction
At the founding of the United Nations (UN), the Security Council was tasked with
regulating state sovereignty and maintaining international peace and security. Although the core
principles and purposes of the UN outlined in the preamble and Chapter 1 of the Charter also
include the reaffirmation of fundamental human rights, different organs were created to achieve
1

the UN’s diverse purposes. The encouragement and monitoring of human rights was assigned to
the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) and its Commission on Human Rights, which was
replaced by the Human Rights Council in 2006. A strict separation of responsibility between
these organs was maintained until 1991, when the subject of human rights legitimately entered
Security Council deliberations for the first time. The inclusion of human rights concerns during
deliberations about Iraq’s aggressive behavior toward Kuwait and its threatening behavior in the
region, sparked rancorous debate among Security Council members. States like Hungary, Japan
and Austria argued that there was a link between enforcing respect for human rights and
maintaining international peace and security.1 China and India argued that addressing human
rights concerns was not within the competency of the Security Council and therefore
inappropriate to discuss, citing the division of labor created by the UN Charter.2 In the two
decades since then, violations of the most fundamental human rights, including genocide, war
crimes and crimes against humanity, have featured prominently in United Nations Security
Council (UNSC) deliberations on situations of inter- and intra-state conflict. This growing
prominence of human rights norms is changing the meaning of state sovereignty and
international security in the UNSC. Indeed, the Security Council now contributes to limited
human rights protection through the selective use of humanitarian intervention, the creation of
and referral to international courts and tribunals, and by advocating for the fulfillment of
international humanitarian and international human rights law in deliberations, Presidential
Statements and Security Council Resolutions.
This paper explores how norm entrepreneurs inside and outside the UNSC have shaped
Council practice such that it now concerns itself, albeit on a selective basis, with fundamental
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UN Security Council, 11 August 1992 (S/PV.3105), 22, 47, 57.
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and systematic violations of international human rights and international humanitarian law in
conflict situations. Part I describes the emergence of human rights norms in Security Council
deliberations and how across a period of two decades, human rights norms changed sovereignty
norms such that it became possible for the Council to define gross human rights violations as a
threat to international peace and security and to punish its authors through military and judicial
measures. Part II examines the Security Council initiative on the rule of law and how a
perceived responsibility to protect has evolved into a perceived responsibility to prosecute. This
includes the institutionalization of new accountability standards like UN guidelines on
prosecutions and amnesties for post-conflict states. Even now, as the Security Council remains
divided on the appropriate response to mass killing in Syria, human rights concerns feature
prominently in Council deliberations about the situation. The Council meets regularly to discuss
Syria’s internal affairs and often criticizes the al-Assad regime. In formal meetings, Council
members literally dictate to the Syrian government how to manage its police and military forces,
how to appropriately respond to the demands and aspirations of its people, and demands that it
protects the fundamental human rights of its people. This paper is interested in the effect that
human rights advocacy by the human rights movement has had on the UN Security Council, yet
it is also interested in exploring whether or not new Security Council practices themselves
(advocating for the fulfillment of fundamental human rights and promoting international
humanitarian law and international human rights law) should be considered a form of human
rights advocacy. This is the subject of the Conclusion. Can we reasonably consider the Security
Council as involved in a form of human rights advocacy? What are the implications of UNSC
involvement in regulating the domestic human rights practices of the states on their agenda?
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Part I: The United Nations Security Council and Human Rights Norms
There has been a dramatic change in international human rights standards over the past
several decades. Human rights norms and state adherence to them matter in international
politics. While considerable debate remains over the degree to which human rights ideas
actually change state behavior, particularly among international relations and international law
scholars, human rights discourse has permeated the common language of domestic and
international politics. And contemporary beliefs about human rights at the domestic and
international level are transforming the meaning of state sovereignty and the legitimate purpose
of enforcement action by the United Nations Security Council. As scholar and activist Michael
Ignatieff writes, “Human rights has become the dominant moral vocabulary in foreign affairs.”
(Ignatieff, 2002).
The UNSC is known as a realm of great power politics and historically it did not consider
human rights as a legitimate subject of deliberation or human rights enforcement as a legitimate
purpose of council enforcement action. Throughout much of the UN’s history, the state’s
treatment of its own population was regarded as within the domestic jurisdiction of states. Yet as
international human rights norms have become increasingly legitimate and widespread, gross
violations of human rights have been defined by the Security Council as threats to international
peace and security; militarily stopping ethnic cleansing has become legitimate; and the criminal
punishment of the architects of war crimes, even by state leaders, has become the subject of
Council consideration. In some limited respects, the Security Council has found itself involved
in the work of monitoring, punishing and advocating for the fulfillment of fundamental
international human rights standards.
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War Against Iraq (1991) and the Emergence of Human Rights ideas in the Security Council
Human rights considerations lacked legitimacy in Security Council deliberations until
1991 when a series of decisions in the case of Iraq in 1991 allowed for the limited consideration
of human rights concerns. This had the unintended consequence of legitimizing human rights
norms as a subject of council debate and laid the groundwork for future humanitarian
intervention. This initial deviation in Security Council practice was made possible by a
dramatically changed historical and political context – the end of the Cold War and globalization
– and contingencies specific to the Iraq case. The extraordinary maltreatment of the Iraqi people
by Iraqi president Saddam Hussein the aftermath of his defeat by coalition forces caused an
unprecedented humanitarian disaster as millions of Iraqi Kurds and Shi’as fled across Iraq’s
borders into neighboring Iran and Turkey (Marr 2011, 253). Because this humanitarian crisis
occurred within the context of a traditional interstate war between Iraq and Kuwait, it was
possible for Security Council members to consider the relationship between human rights and
international security. During formal deliberations, the UNSC incorporated Secretariat briefings
on Iraq’s domestic human rights situation – breaking with past practice that excluded such
considerations. Because the effects of Saddam Hussein’s human rights violations were
threatening both regional peace and security and the sovereignty of Turkey and Iran, the Security
Council passed Resolution 688, which condemned Iraqi violations of human rights and
demanded international access to Iraq’s population and territory. The passage of Resolution 688
was a watershed moment – it was the first Security Council resolution to define domestic human
rights violations as a threat to international peace and security because of its trans-border effects.
In part, Resolution 688, “condemns the repression of the Iraqi civilian population in many parts
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of Iraq, including most recently in the Kurdish-populated areas, the consequences of which
threaten international peace and security in the region” (S/RES/688, 1991).
By dictating the terms of the Iraqi government’s treatment of its own population and
curtailing its freedom of movement, Resolution 688 challenged the traditional meaning of
sovereignty by interfering in the internal affairs of the Iraqi state and by linking minimal
standards of human rights protection to the meaning of legitimate sovereign authority. This
interference only became possible because Iraq’s own sovereignty had been temporarily
suspended by the UN after it had violated core Charter principles. The use of military force
against Iraq was unquestionably straightforward exercise of Chapter VII to reverse international
aggression by Iraq against Kuwait. The cease fire imposed by the UN “was one of the most
intrusive since the Second World War,” demonstrating the seriousness of Iraq’s transgression of
international norms (Marr 2011, 265). Absent this context, it is highly unlikely that Iraq’s
treatment of its marginalized populations would have garnered Security Council attention at all,
let alone intrusive enforcement action to stop it. Widespread agreement about Iraq’s pariah
status, the suspension of Iraqi sovereignty, and the impact on security of the Iraqi government’s
human rights violations together created an environment in which a once impermissible practice
– the linking of human rights and international security by the UNSC – became possible.
Somalia
In 1992, during deliberations on Somalia, the Security Council for the first time defined a
humanitarian crisis as a threat to international peace and security on its own merits and not based
on its effects on other states. The decision to use military force to respond to a humanitarian
catastrophe within a failed state resulted in the enhanced legitimacy of human rights norms and
led to the emergence of a new Security Council practice – humanitarian intervention. Like the
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case of Iraq before it, some UNSC members, including Australia, France, India, Nigeria and
Zimbabwe, argued that the ongoing violence and its impact on civilians threatened peace and
stability in the entire region (S/PV.3060 1992, 9-10, 41, 44, 46). Despite this expressed concern
about regional impact, however, Resolution 746 defined the continuation of the internal
humanitarian crisis in Somalia as a threat to international peace and security, rather than its
cross-border effects. “Deeply disturbed by the magnitude of the human suffering caused by the
conflict and concerned that the continuation of the situation in Somalia constitutes a threat to
international peace and security,” the resolution proclaimed (S/RES/746 1992). This same
language was repeated in Resolution 751, which established United Nations peacekeeping
Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM). The Security Council made no reference to interstate
dimensions of the conflict, trans-border refugee flows, or the risk of regional spillover in either
resolution. Instead, nontraditional conceptions of security – that international security is affected
by the violation of human rights – shaped initial UNSC reaction to the conflict. For example,
Special Representative of the Secretary-General of the United Nations for Somalia, Admiral
Jonathon Howe, described the situation in Somalia as falling within the realm of “universal
interests” – the shared world interest that nations collectively are willing to defend, including
stopping the mass killing of civilians (Howe, 1995). Former U.S. assistant secretary of state for
African affairs Chester Crocker similarly argued, “It is surely wise that we and others broaden
our understanding of national interest to include consideration of interests related to global order
(sanctity of borders, extension of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty) and global standards
(avoiding genocide, mass humanitarian catastrophe) (Crocker 1995, 7). Security Council
decision-making in Somalia marked an important advance in the emerging idea that the
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international community, in general, and the Security Council in particular, had a responsibility
to respond to humanitarian crises caused by human conflict in order to end human suffering.
Bosnia-Herzegovina
The discourse used by Security Council members during formal meetings about the
Bosnian war (1992-1995) demonstrates that their responses to the conflict were shaped by both
core values including human rights and core security interests. For many permanent members of
the Council, the war in Bosnia threatened fundamental norms – of equality, human rights, and
justice – but did not threaten economic or military security interests. Over time, however, the
incongruence between the professed values of European states and international institutions like
the UN and their responses to the Bosnian conflict fundamentally threatened their international
standing and legitimacy respectively. Threats to values became threats to interests. Throughout
the conflict, human rights norms shaped and transformed understandings of international peace
and security and state sovereignty in the Security Council. In the case of Bosnia, the interaction
of national interests and human rights norms influenced Security Council decision making.
Consideration of international human rights law and international humanitarian law led the
Council to create the first ad hoc international criminal tribunal to prosecute leaders for war
crimes since Nuremberg – the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia in 1993
– and eventually paved the way for humanitarian intervention to stop ethnic massacres in 1995.
Security Council members unanimously condemned the practice of ethnic cleansing in a
series of presidential statements and Security Council resolutions (S/PV.3101 August 1992;
S/RES/771 1992; S/RES/798 1992; S/RES/808 1993; S/RES/827 1993). Security Council
members indicated by the passage of these resolutions that the protection of human rights and
respect for international humanitarian law were intricately linked to the maintenance of
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international peace and security. For example, in explaining its support for Resolutions 770
authorizing sanctions against Serbia and Montenegro and 771 condemning ethnic cleansing, the
representative from Hungary argued, “The adoption of these two resolutions is another example,
in our opinion, of the strong commitment of the Security Council to human rights and
humanitarian issues. To act urgently is not only a moral obligation of the Council: it is
indispensable for the preservation of the credibility of the United Nations. Only a credible
Organization and a credible Security Council can perform their basic functions – maintaining
international peace and security” (S/PV.3106, 32). Cape Verde argued that the grave violations
occurring in Bosnia were crimes committed against all of the international community and not
just the Bosnians because “they violate our very decency and human dignity” (S/PV.3082, 56).
Venezuela defended its vote in favor of sanctions “for reasons that are basically humanitarian,”
asserting explicitly, “respect for the norms and principles of international law is a prerequisite for
peace and security in the world. Any State that violates them must be condemned” (S/PV.3082,
27). But not all Council members agreed that human rights considerations had a place in
Security Council decision making. India, China and Zimbabwe purposefully denied the linkage
between human rights and international security and questioned their relevance to Security
Council deliberations (S/PV.3106). Notably, however, while China expressed its reservations
about human rights considerations in formal meetings and abstained from voting on resolutions
that linked human rights and humanitarian law to Chapter VII of the Charter, it did not veto
them.
Rwanda
The Security Council response to the genocide in Rwanda is best known for its
fundamental failure and the cynical protection of national interests above international human
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rights concerns (see Barnett 2002, Dallaire 2003, Power 2002). For example, permanent
members rescued their own nationals within days of the start of systematic slaughter but refused
to use their troops to reinforce the UN peacekeeping mission on the ground or provide protection
to Rwandan civilians. Humanitarian intervention to stop the killing was not authorized for
Rwanda. Yet despite these failures, UNSC members also formally condemned violations of
international humanitarian and human rights law, created an independent commission of experts
to investigate atrocities, and established the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda to
prosecute the perpetrators. Council members also were criticized by their domestic populations
and other UN member states for failing to fulfill their human rights responsibilities by not
stopping the genocide.
In total, 8 states cosponsored Resolution 935 establishing the Independent Commission to
study human rights violations, including Argentina, the Czech Republic, France, New Zealand,
Spain, the UK, and the U.S. The council passed it unanimously. Combined, members cited five
international human rights treaties and the entire body of international humanitarian law as
justification for its passage (S/PV.3400).3 In November 1994, the U.S. and New Zealand
cosponsored a resolution creating an international criminal tribunal to prosecute individuals
guilty of international human rights and humanitarian law violations. Argentina, France, the
Russian Federation, Spain and the UK endorsed the resolution. The ICTR was justified as
necessary because “the gravity of the human rights violations committed in Rwanda extended far
beyond that country,” concerning the international community as a whole (S/PV.3452, 6). The
Tribunal was intended to send “a clear message that the international community is not prepared
to leave unpunished the grave crimes committed in Rwanda” including violations of the
3

The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the International Covenant on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial
Discrimination, the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Genocide, the Convention Against Torture,
and the Convention on the Rights of the Child.
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fundamental rules of war, international human rights standards, and the Genocide Convention
(S/PV.3452, 8). Even China, which abstained, declared publicly its condemnation of violations
of international humanitarian law and genocide, publicly underscoring Council consensus on the
importance of human rights to Security Council decision-making at that time.
Certainly the Rwanda case raises important questions about the authenticity of
humanitarian justifications and appeals to human rights. This skepticism is warranted; yet these
very criticisms demonstrate the increasing influence of human rights norms on the members of
the UNSC, who are compelled to appeal to human rights norms to justify their behavior whether
they sincerely value them or not.
Kosovo
Security Council debates about whether or not to intervene to stop ethnic cleansing in
Kosovo laid bare the tension between Council members about the relationship among human
rights, state sovereignty and international security. At stake was nothing less than determining
the limits of both state authority and state control over population and territory. In an era of
increasing state commitment to human rights principles, Council members struggled to identify
where the rights of the state and its duties to its population begin and end. Immediately,
divisions on the cause and character of the conflict arose between the permanent members of the
Council. Russia and China defended Serbian sovereignty rights and its authority to defend its
rule whereas France, the UK and the U.S. argued that sovereignty could not be used to justify
ethnic cleansing and violations of fundamental human rights. With the UNSC stymied by
inaction, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) launched a humanitarian intervention
without Council authorization. In a series of emergency meetings to discuss NATO’s illegal use
of force, NATO members on the Council defended their actions in human rights terms. The U.S.
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argued, “We and our allies have begun military action only with the greatest reluctance. But we
believe that such action is necessary to respond to Belgrade’s brutal persecution of Kosovar
Albanians, violations of international law, and excessive and indiscriminate use of force…”
(S/PV.3988, 4). According to this argument, Belgrade’s systematic policy of undermining
international agreements and its violation of international human rights law and the laws of war
provided adequate legal justification for humanitarian intervention. Canada underscored its
humanitarian motives, “We cannot simply stand by while innocents are murdered, an entire
population is displace, villages are burned and looted, and a population is denied its basic rights
merely because the people concerned do not belong to the ‘right’ ethnic group (S/PV.3988, 6).
The UK argued that humanitarian intervention was undertaken on the basis of “overwhelming
humanitarian necessity” and France asserted that both peace in Europe and human rights were at
stake (S/PV.3988, 8-9, 11). Argentina defended NATO’s action arguing that there was a
humanitarian obligation to end the violence in Kosovo based on solid legal foundations, despite
NATO’s decision to circumvent Council authority.
Argentina also wishes to stress that the fulfillment of the legal norms of international
humanitarian law and human rights is a response to universally recognized and accepted
values and commitments. The obligation to protect and ensure respect for these rights
falls to everyone and cannot be debated. The obligation is all the more urgent given that
it has been alleged, witnessed and proven that, in that region, extremely serious
international crimes have been committed, including acts of genocide, some of which are
being tried in a special tribunal established by this Council (S/PV.3988, 7-8).
A resolution to censure NATO for its illegal breach of Charter principles was put up to vote in
the Security Council and failed 3 to 12 because most Council members perceived the use of

12

military force in defense of human rights in Kosovo to be legitimate. Through deliberately
acting inappropriately (intervening without Security Council authorization), NATO members
attempted to redefine the standards of appropriate military action. NATO humanitarian
intervention reflected growing support for the idea that it is morally acceptable to use force to
prevent or end humanitarian crises and gross human rights violations. An emerging standard of
what was morally right, however, was in tension with existing norms of what was legally
permissible (Economides 2007: 231). The NATO action prompted a worldwide debate about the
meaning and responsibilities of sovereignty in an international society gripped by the power of
ideas about human rights and the rule of law. With the Security Council deeply divided and
relations among permanent members tarnished, the debate about the meaning of sovereignty and
the legitimacy of humanitarian intervention moved outside the UN and was taken up by a newly
established International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS).
In 2001, the ICISS released its groundbreaking report, The Responsibility to Protect, in
which it defended a conceptualization of sovereignty includes state responsibility for the
protection of human rights. The Commission argued that sovereignty implied dual
responsibility. Externally, states must respect the sovereignty of other states but internally, states
must respect the rights and fundamental dignity of its citizens (ICISS 2001: 7-8). Acceptance of
sovereignty as responsibility means that when a state is unable or unwilling to protect its
population, the state’s responsibility to protect must be filled by the international community and
specifically by the UNSC (ICISS 2001: xi). A slightly modified version of the responsibility to
protect was endorsed by UN members in the 2005 World Summit Outcome Document.
Subsequently, the Council formally endorsed the responsibility to protect in Resolution 1674
(2006) and Resolution 1894 (2009) on the protection of civilians in armed combat and in Council
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Resolutions on the situation in Darfur in 2006 and in Libya, Côte D’Ivoire, South Sudan and the
Middle East in 2011.4
ICC Referrals in Darfur and Libya
Ideas about human rights and international humanitarian law shaped Council decision
making about Darfur and led to important innovations in Security Council practice, despite the
absence of humanitarian intervention. In September 2004, the Council signaled its concern with
human rights when it authorized an Independent Commission of Inquiry to investigate
allegations of international humanitarian law and human rights violations in Darfur
(S/RES/1564). Later, the UNSC made a historic decision when it exercised its right to refer
cases to the International Criminal Court by passing Resolution 1593, giving the ICC jurisdiction
over Darfur. During the debate on the resolution and in subsequent ICC briefings to the Council,
many Council Members directly linked the peaceful settlement of the Darfur conflict with the
pursuit of justice and human rights protection with the maintenance of international peace and
security.
Similarly, Security Council members justified their passage of Resolution 1970 referring
the situation in Libya to the International Criminal Court on the basis of human rights principles.
During the deliberations accompanying the passage of Resolution 1970, the Secretary-General
and UNSC members made nearly twenty explicit references to the importance of international
law and particularly international humanitarian and human rights law, spoke out against
impunity, and demanded that perpetrators of violations be brought to justice in court
(S/PV.6491). In referring the situation to the ICC for investigation, Resolution 1970 specifically

4

UN Security Council, “Resolution 1970,” 26 February 2011; UN Security Council, “Resolution 1973,m” 17 March
2011; UN Security Council, “Resolution 1975,” 30 March 2011; UN Security Council, “1996,” 8 July 2011; UN
Security Council, “Resolution 2014,” 21 October 2011; and UN Security Council, “Resolution 2016,” 27 October
2011.
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condemns, “serious violations of human rights and international humanitarian law that are being
committed in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya,” considers that widespread and systematic attacks
against civilians may amount to crimes against humanity, and demands that Libyan authorities
fully respect human rights and international humanitarian law (S/RE/1970).
Security Council members also justified the passage of Resolution 1973 which authorized
the use of all necessary measures to protect civilians in Libya on human rights grounds. As
examples, Brazil, Lebanon, Nigeria and Portugal characterized the violence perpetrated against
civilians by Libyan authorities as crimes that stemmed from authorities’ “disrespect for
obligations under international humanitarian law and human rights law” (S/PV.6498: 6, 9).
Portugal has consistently condemned the indiscriminate violence against civilians and the
gross and systematic violations of human rights and of humanitarian law perpetrated by a
regime that has lost all of its credibility and legitimacy vis-à-vis its own population and
the international community (S/PV.6498: 8).
The preamble of Resolution 1973 characterized the violence as “gross and systematic violations
of human rights, including arbitrary detentions, forced disappearances, and torture and summary
executions.” The resolution describes these attacks as widespread and systematic in character,
possibly amounting to “crimes against humanity.” The passage of Resolutions 1970 and 1973
marked a significant evolution in the Security Council’s response to mass atrocities. Within
weeks of the outbreak of violence, UNSC members referred the human rights violations in Libya
to the ICC for investigation and enforced stringent sanctions against Libyan authorities and
subsequently authorized humanitarian intervention to prevent civilian massacres.
As these examples show, human rights norms have changed sovereignty norms such that
it has become possible for the Council to define gross human rights violations as a threat to
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international peace and security and to punish its authors through military and judicial measures.
In some respects, the Security Council has begun to contribute to limited human rights
protection: 1) through the selective use of humanitarian intervention; 2) with the creation of
international tribunals and referral of cases to the International Criminal Court; and 3) by
criticizing violations of international humanitarian and human rights law in Presidential
Statements and Security Council Resolutions and advocating for their fulfillment. Through these
acts the Security Council is engaged in a form of advocacy – it monitors and punishes human
rights violations and calls for the fulfillment of human rights. These changes in Security Council
practices signals that state observance of minimal human rights standards is an increasingly
significant component of state responsibility within international society.

Part II: The Security Council, the Rule of Law and development of UN Standards
Demands for Criminal Accountability for Mass Atrocities in Sierra Leone
The venture of the United Nations Security Council into the realm of international
criminal law has been described by David Malone (2008) as “groundbreaking.” While rule of
law and justice issues are now part of mainstream Council discussion and action (Security
Council Report 2010), international criminal law only first entered into Security Council
discourse as a legitimate subject in the 1990s. The emergence of justice issues in the Council was
part of a wider dynamic that coincided with the end of the Cold War rivalry that historically
divided the Security Council: the increasing legitimacy of human rights norms and a changing
understanding of international security in which the observance of human rights and the
development of international law were integral to its realization. As mentioned above, human
rights concerns first became an appropriate topic for Security Council discussion in the context
of the 1991 Gulf War; but human rights were only relevant in cases where violations of human
16

rights were deemed to threaten international peace and security. In general, these are gross
human rights violations rising to the level of ethnic cleansing or genocide, war crimes and crimes
against humanity. By the mid-1990s humanitarian intervention to stop such grave crimes had
become a possible, if infrequently exercised, course of Security Council action (Walling 2013). It
was in the aftermath of UN failures to stop mass atrocities in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Rwanda
that the Security Council authorized the creation of the first ad hoc international criminal
tribunals since Nuremberg to prosecute alleged perpetrators of war crimes, crimes against
humanity, genocide and violations of fundamental human rights. The Security Council justified
the creation of the tribunals as necessary for ensuring that violations of international law were
halted and effectively redressed; and for the restoration and maintenance of peace and security
(S/RES/827; S/RES/955).
The behavior of the Security Council was shaped in part by the increasing robustness of
the justice norm itself – the idea that the most basic violations of human rights cannot be
legitimate acts of state but are crimes committed by individuals who should be prosecuted
through formal judicial proceedings (Sikkink 2011: 13). Yet individuals also have been at the
center of institutionalizing the justice norm in the United Nations. The creation of the ad-hoc
tribunals would not have been possible without the strong advocacy of individuals like Former
US Ambassador to the United Nations Madeleine Albright and Klaus Kinkel, then foreign
minister of Germany who argued that remedial action was necessary in Bosnia and Rwanda for
both moral and practical reasons of maintaining UN legitimacy and credibility (Malone 2008:
732). Former Secretary-General Kofi Annan, another norm entrepreneur, used his bully pulpit to
advance a vision of international security that incorporates respect for human rights, fosters
development, promotes justice and strengthens the rule of law. What follows are two examples
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that illustrate how the increasing resort to human rights trials and increasing activism at the
United Nations have led to the formal institutionalization of international standards on the
prosecution of human rights violations and limitations on the use of amnesties for transitional
states.
Evidence of the growing influence of the justice norm on United Nations policy was
evidenced at the signing of the Lomé Peace Agreement in July 1999 which sought to end the
decade old civil war between the Government of Sierra Leone and the leaders of the
Revolutionary United Front (RUF). During the civil war, domestic and international human
rights organizations had meticulously documented human rights violations in preparation for
eventual accountability. In the lead up to the negotiations human rights activists made a
sustained effort to keep alive the discussion of the establishment of some sort of formal
accountability and reconciliation mechanism despite repeated government offers of amnesty to
rebels for disarmament (O’Flaherty 2004: 49). Similarly, the senior UN observer to the peace
talks, Francis Okelo, the Special Representative to the Secretary General, pressed Sierra Leone
President Kabbah to deny amnesty to the most serious rights violators. Despite these pressures,
the peace agreement negotiated between the two sides included a general amnesty for crimes
committed during Sierra Leone’s civil war which covered the principal architects.
Dissatisfied with the amnesty, then Secretary-General Kofi Annan instructed Okelo to
dissociate the UN from it. Reflecting growing consensus within the UN Secretariat that durable
peace cannot be built upon impunity and that leaders who orchestrate war crimes and crimes
against humanity are not immune from criminal accountability, Okelo appended a handwritten
disclaimer: “the United Nations holds the understanding that the amnesty and pardon in Article
IX of the agreement shall not apply to international crimes of genocide, crimes against humanity,
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war crimes and other serious violations of international humanitarian law” (Schabas 2004:149).5
Annan stressed that the domestic amnesty agreed to by the Government of Sierra Leone would
not prevent the United Nations from holding alleged perpetrators criminally accountable for
international crimes including genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity.
Even with the Special Representative’s exclusion of international crimes from the
amnesty, some Security Council members including Gambia and the Netherlands expressed
discontent with the inclusion of any amnesty provision, seeing it as inconsistent with the
principles of justice espoused by the Council in its previous statements and resolutions
(S/PV.4035, 11 August 1999). The Security Council in its June 1998 Presidential Statement on
Sierra Leone (S/PRST/1998/18) had stressed the obligation of States to prosecute perpetrators of
grave breaches of international humanitarian law and its February 1999 Presidential Statement
(S/PRST/199/6) affirmed the need to bring to justice individuals who cause violence against
civilians during armed conflicts.6 Security Council Resolution 1231, which passed three months
prior to the amnesty in March 1999, had authorized the appropriate authorities to investigate
allegations of human rights violations in Sierra Leone for the purposes of future prosecution.
A year after the Lomé Peace Accord, the Security Council unanimously passed
Resolution 1315 (2000) which established a special court for Sierra Leone that would have
jurisdiction over persons bearing the greatest responsibility for crimes against humanity, war
crimes and other serious violations of international law during the country’s civil war. The
preamble of Resolution 1315 noted the Special-Representative’s appended note to the Lomé
Peace Accord barring amnesty for grave international crimes. When the cases of Morris Kallon,
5

Schabas explains that the statement by the Special Representative of the Secretary General does not appear in the
text of the agreement published by the United Nations (U.N. Doc. S/1999/777). The statement was appended in
handwriting on the official copy of the Lomé Accord.
6
Though not all Security Council members defended individual criminal accountability on the record, presidential
statements are consensus documents that have the unanimous approval of the Council.
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former rebel military commander in the Revolutionary United Front, and Brima Bazzy Kamara,
commander of the soldiers of the Sierra Leonean Armed Forces Revolutionary Council came
before the Court, the two defendants filed a motion questioning the legality of the repeal of the
amnesty agreed upon by the parties to the conflict. The Appeals Chamber of the Special Court
for Sierra Leone ruled that while sovereign states have the right to confer amnesties in their
domestic jurisdiction they do not have the right to deprive other states of exercising universal
jurisdiction over international crimes (Schabas 2004: 162). The Appeals Chamber argued, “It
stands to reason that a state cannot sweep such crimes into oblivion and forgetfulness which
other states have jurisdiction to prosecute by reason of the fact that the obligation to protect
human dignity is a peremptory norm and has assumed the nature of obligation erga omnes”
(Schabas 2004: 161).7 So while negotiating a domestic amnesty was a sovereign right of the
government of Sierra Leone, it was not within its authority to prevent other states from
exercising their universal rights to prosecute violators of international crimes, even when they
occurred in Sierra Leone.
Institutionalization of Accountability Norms for Violations of Fundamental Human Rights
Efforts by the United Nations Secretariat to formally institutionalize the justice norm and
its corollary – the proscription of amnesty for genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity
– in the standard operating procedures of the United Nations occurred over the decade of the
2000s. The office of the Secretary-General under both Kofi Annan (1997-2006) and Ban Kimoon (2007-present) was central to this development. For example, coverage of rule of law
issues in reports of the Secretary-General expanded between 2003 and 2010 from an already
notable 80% to roughly 90% (Security Council Report 2011: 17). The growing strength and
7

Prosecutor v. Morris Kallon and Brima Buzzy Kamara, Special Court for Sierra Leone, SCSL-2004-15-AD72(E)
and SCSL-2004-16-AK72(E) Decision on Challenge to Jurisdiction: Lomé Accord Amnesty, Apeals Chamber, 13
March 2004.
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influence of the justice norm is also reflected in its presence as a recurring subject on the agenda
of the Security Council – an organ historically concerned with traditional peace and security
issues and not justice and rule of law issues. An analysis of Security Council resolutions by
Security Council Report demonstrates that 89% of thematic resolutions and 74% of countryspecific situation resolutions between 2003 and 2010 contained rule of law elements (Security
Council Report 2011: 15). Indeed, the Secretariat and Security Council along with the General
Assembly and Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) have adopted a
coordinated position and uniform standards with regards to violations of international
humanitarian and human rights law – that the architects of grave international crimes must be
held criminally accountable for them and that amnesties designed to protect government leaders
from prosecution for these crimes are illegitimate and possibly illegal under international law. 8
In September 2003, the 15 members of the Security Council, an additional 25 members of
the General Assembly and several members of the UN Secretariat met to discuss the UN’s role
with regard to justice and the rule of law. In total, the formal positions of 62 states were
represented during the meeting which was deemed so important that Security Council members
met at the Ministerial level.9 Opening the debate, Secretary General Kofi Annan recognized that
in post-conflict situations, states must strike a balance between justice and reconciliation. He
noted however that in striking that balance, members of the United Nations were obligated to
adhere to international standards – the standards derived from the Charter of the United Nations
as well as the principles of international humanitarian law, international human rights law,

8

S/PV.4833, 24 September 2003; S/PV.4835, 30 September 2003; s/2004/616, 23 August 2004;A/RES/60/147, 21
March 2006; S/PRST/2006/28, 22 June 2006; Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, Rule of Law
Tools for Post-Conflict States: Prosecution Initiatives (United Nations, 2006); and Office of the High Commissioner
for Human Rights, Rule of Law Tools for Post-Conflict States: Amnesties (United Nations, 2009)
9
Though the representatives of only 40 states attended the actual meeting, 22 additional states formally affiliated
themselves with the statement of the European Union.
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international refugee law and international criminal law (S/PV.4833, 24 September 2003: 3).
Arguing that “justice is the handmaiden of true peace,” Annan stated unequivocally that “there
should be no amnesties for war crimes, genocide, crimes against humanity or other serious
violations of international human rights and humanitarian law” (S/PV.4833, 24 September
2003:3). In total, 44 of the 62 states (70%) agreed that there should be no impunity for genocide,
war crimes and crimes against humanity and that responsibility for such violations should focus
on the top of the chain of command.10 These states expressed support for the idea that there is an
international obligation to end such violations and to punish those responsible for them. The
UK’s foreign secretary, Jack Straw, the convener of the meetings, boldly stated, “No one – no
Head of Government or State – is above the law” (S/PV.4833, 24 September 2003: 23). Only 4
states (Pakistan, San Marino, Uruguay and the USA) argued that the demands of peace should
trump the pursuit of justice when the two come into conflict, urging domestic flexibility with
regards to human rights prosecutions (S/PV.4833, 24 September 2003; S/PV.4835, 30 September
2003). Notably, several post-transition states emphasized that no single one-size fits all approach
is possible with regards to transitional justice, but even the majority of post-conflict states argued
that peace and justice were inextricably intertwined (S/PV.4833; S/PV.4835).11
By tracking the statements of Security Council members and participating members of
the General Assembly, it is evident that there was a regional dynamic at play. The vast majority
of states that self-selected to participate in the meeting were from Europe or the Americas and
10

The states who stated or formally associated themselves with this position during the September 2003 debates
include: Angola, Argentina, Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Bulgaria, Cameroon, Canada, Chile, Cypress, Czech
Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Italy, Japan, Latvia,
Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Pakistan, Philippines, Poland,
Portugal, Romania, the Russian Federation, Serbia and Montenegro, Sierra Leone, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Korea,
Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey and the United Kingdom.
11
See in particular the statements by Argentina, Brazil, Uruguay and South Korea. Note that Argentina and South
Korea made statements against impunity for grave crimes but also argued for a pragmatic approach to amnesty and
truth commissions or what South Korea described as an approach of “sufficient justice” S/PV.4835, 30 September
2003.
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nearly 75% of the total participants in the debate were from the European region who almost
unanimously supported the adoption of international standards mandating individual criminal
accountability for perpetrators of grave international crimes and the proscription of amnesties for
these same crimes.12
In his subsequent report to the Security Council on “the rule of law and transitional
justice in conflict and post-conflict societies”, Secretary-General Kofi Annan suggested that UN
norms and standards include the following:




United Nations-endorsed peace agreements can never promise amnesties for
genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity or gross violations of human
rights;
The United Nations will permit carefully crafted amnesties by states but they can
never be permitted to excuse genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity or
gross violations of human rights; and
Security Council Resolutions and mandates must reject any endorsement of
amnesty for genocide, war crimes or crimes against humanity, including those
relating to ethnic, gender and sexually based international crimes and ensure that
no such amnesty previously granted is a bar to prosecution before any United
Nations-created or assisted court (S/2004/616, 23 August 2004: 11-21).

These normative standards were formally endorsed by the General Assembly and the Security
Council respectively. In March 2006, The General Assembly adopted Resolution 60/147 which
detailed states’ obligations in the aftermath of gross violations of international human rights law
and serious violations of international humanitarian law. The Resolution stresses that states have
an obligation to respect, ensure respect for and implement international human rights law and
international humanitarian law. States’ obligations include the duty to “investigate effectively,
promptly, thoroughly and impartially,” to prosecute alleged perpetrators, and to protect victims’
right to effective remedy including access to both truth and justice. No statutes of limitations
may apply to grave violations under international law (A/RES/60147, 21 March 2006: 1-6). The
12

Data for this analysis was drawn from S/PV.4833, 24 September 2003 and S/PV.4835, 30 September 2003.
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Security Council also unanimously endorsed the justice norm in a subsequent presidential
statement.
The Security Council emphasizes the responsibility of States to comply with their
obligations to end impunity and to prosecute those responsible for genocide, crimes
against humanity and serious violations of international humanitarian law…The Council
intends to continue forcefully to fight impunity with appropriate means and draws
attention to the full range of justice and reconciliation mechanisms to be considered,
including national, international and ‘mixed’ criminal courts and tribunals and truth and
reconciliation commissions (S/PRST/2006/28, 22 June 2006).
These endorsements by the Security Council though suggestive in nature are notable. Even more
so because the Council also “emphasized the responsibility of States to comply with their
relevant obligations to end impunity and to prosecute those responsible for war crimes, genocide,
crimes against humanity and serious violations of international humanitarian law” in Resolution
1674 (2006) – a binding Security Council Resolution on civilians in armed conflict.
As these two examples illustrate, ideas about human rights have led not only to a
responsibility for the Security Council to protect civilians from mass atrocity but also into a
perceived responsibility to aid the prosecution of perpetrators of war crimes, crimes against
humanity and genocide.

Conclusion: the UN Security Council and Human Rights Advocacy?
Civil society actors including human rights NGOs have become important players in
world politics. Organizations like Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International help to set
the international political agenda with regards to human rights. These organizations identify and
define what constitutes a violation of the standards for humane treatment agreed upon by the
24

international community. These NGOs not only enforce current standards of acceptable
behavior, they help define new human rights norms (Clark 2001). They have a discernible
impact upon the actions of states (Cohen 2005, Keck and Sikkink 1999) and institutions like the
United Nations (Weschler 2004). Human rights activists working with NGOs have played a
critical role in the evolution of international human rights norms and practices (Lauren
2003:289). Substantial research has shown that human rights NGOs have put new human rights
issues on the international agenda, helped to create important international human rights
documents and treaties, monitored the human rights records of states and pushed for greater
levels of implementation of human rights standards (Cingranelli and Richards 2001:225). As the
above examples illustrate, even the Security Council takes seriously the relevance of human
rights to its work. (See also Weschler 2004:55).
The growing legitimacy of human rights norms, in large part as a result of a powerful and
effective international human rights movement, means that states can no longer use sovereignty
as a shield to prevent outside actors from scrutinizing and judging their human rights practices
(Roth, 225). Nongovernmental organizations, through their effective fact-finding and advocacy,
build pressure on governments to fulfill their human rights obligations. Indeed, advocacy has
become the core method of human rights promotion and change. Human rights advocacy
includes the promotion of causes, principles ideas and norms and advocating for policy changes
done for the purpose of the development, implementation and enforcement of human rights
norms (Keck and Sikkink 7-9). According to Carroll Bogert, associate director of Human Rights
Watch, publicity, or what human rights organizations call “naming and shaming” has been an
important tool of the international human rights movement since its very beginning (Bogert
2011: 175-6). Human Rights Watch describes its advocacy efforts as entailing detailed
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recommendations for relevant policy makers about how to end abuse and to press for these
policy options to be adopted (Bogert, 6 of chapter). In short, international human rights
movement, with NGOs at the center, develops and applies international standards of human
rights and deploys its information strategically to alter the policy agendas of both rights
observing and rights abusing states (see Roth, 228-9). Organizations like Amnesty International
and Human Rights Watch expose the authors of human rights crimes and subject them to public
condemnation (Roth, 229). In light of this description of human rights advocacy, Security
Council practice with regards to states like Sierra Leone and Sudan is not dissimilar. Council
deliberations condemn violations of gross violations of human rights and international
humanitarian law and criticize their perpetrators. Through its presidential statements and
resolutions (the latter which are legally binding decisions), the Security Council defines
international human rights standards and demands member compliance with those standards. By
creating international commissions of inquiry, the Security Council has monitored state
compliance with human rights standards and it has punished deviations from those standards
through humanitarian intervention and international prosecution in international courts and
tribunals. Does it make sense to consider Security Council practice as it relates to human rights a
form of human rights advocacy? What are the implications for the international human rights
movement and the fulfillment of human rights in general, if states, the primary violators of
human rights and the principle targets of human right advocacy, became centrally engaged in
human rights advocacy practices? Does this development represent the strengthening or the
dilution of the international human rights regime? These are important and vexing questions that
warrant investigation by human rights scholars and practitioners.
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